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of the note's authors using apparently similar data and methods. We were aware of the contents of the paper before its publication because one of us was a referee for the paper.
The results with which we are concerned are those for the long run average buyand-hold abnormal return (ABHAR) following the open offers, and the two-day average abnormal return (AAR) on their announcement. The discrepancies in relation to our published findings are as follows. First, Ngatuni, Capstaff and Marshall (2007) significant. We elaborate on these differences below.
Our puzzlement is with regard to the results derived from share returns. We have no reason to question the findings from accounting data regarding discretionary accruals around open offers. But if the estimates of the long and short run abnormal returns in the paper are not reliable, the results reported for the relationships between these variables and the discretionary current accruals (DCA) variable may likewise not be reliable.
Long run abnormal returns
Iqbal et al. refer to Ngatuni et al. (2007) 1 who examined the long term performance of UK firms making SEOs. The main focus of that study was a large sample of rights issues made during the period 1986-1995, but they also examined a smaller sample of open offers. They used a BHAR methodology as follows. The BHAR on security j over the holding period τ to T is the difference between the actual and expected buy-and-hold returns (BHRs):
BHAR is the monthly BHR on the offer firm minus the expected BHR. The expected BHR is the return on a matched, non-issuing firm. The matched firms were chosen based on (a) size, (b) size and book-to-market ratio, and (c) size and industry.
The average BHAR for N firms over the holding period was calculated as: Ngatuni et al. (2007) and found negative abnormal post-offer returns. They suggested that the contrasting results are most likely due to a survivorship bias in Ngatuni et al.'s (2007) analysis, where the offer firms were required to survive the full 5-year post-offer period but the matched firms were not. Iqbal et al. are correct in pointing out this inconsistency in Ngatuni et al.'s (2007) framework of analysis, and it does have an impact on the results. The results are different when a requirement to survive the 5-year post-offer period is also imposed on the matched firms, but there is only limited evidence of negative performance. The revised results are summarised in Table 1 . There are notable changes in the magnitude and significance of the findings and, to some extent, they are benchmark sensitive. But, in general, the abnormal returns tend to be positive rather than negative, particularly over the 5-year post-announcement period. Table 1 consideration of a wider range of firms. It may be that a matched firm strictly fits the criteria but has drifted sufficiently to cast doubt on its efficacy. This is more likely when a benchmark contains two criteria. For example, when matching by size and industry the criterion is that the matched firm is in the same industry with the closest, but higher market value. 5 The latter requirement occasionally means that the closest match has a much larger MV, which may undermine the validity of the match. There are other reasons why some researchers do not use an industry based criterion. 6 Iqbal et al. avoided matching problems by using market return as a buy-and-hold benchmark for the results in their Table 5 . However, they may wish to examine more closely the choice of the matched firms for all benchmarks in their replication of Ngatuni et al. (2007) .
The adjusted Ngatuni et al. (2007) results for the size and industry benchmark are also shown in Table 1 above. The imposition of survival on matched firms reduced the sample to 112. The 5-year post-offer ABHAR is 24.75% but it is not statistically significant. There is a small positive ABHAR for the 3-year period, and a small negative ABHAR for the 1-year holding period, both statistically insignificant. Hence, there is no evidence of long term negative performance using the size and industry benchmark, although there are small negative median ABHARs for the two shorter holding periods.
Finding suitable matching firms is less of a problem when a single criterion is used, and this was the case with matching by size only, but the results may be less relatively small samples, and should feature in the discussion of the associated results.
Event study
Iqbal et al. report an AAR for the day before the announcement plus the announcement day of -1.10%, which is not statistically significant (presumably at the
10% level or better). Their starting sample is all 286 open offers by UK listed industrial firms during 1991-95 recorded in the FT Extel Record of Takeovers, Offers and New
Issues. From this sample they subtract 28 offers of less than £1m, 32 repeat offers and 94 offers for which there was insufficient accounting data in Datastream, leaving a final sample of 132 open offers. Their method of calculating the abnormal return for share j on day t, AR jt , is the index model, ie
where R j,t is the return for share j and R M,t is the return on a market index, in this case the FTSE All-Share Index. To enable daily returns to be summed, each return will be calculated as R j,t = ln(P j,t /P j,t-1 )
where P j,t is the share price at the close of day t. Their source for both accounting and share price data is Datastream.
We use the abnormal returns calculated for Armitage (2002) 
where the alpha and beta coefficients were estimated via OLS regression using daily returns and an estimation period of 180 days, and the index used was the FTSE AllShare, as in Iqbal et al. The second method was introduced by Eckbo and Masulis (1992) ; the results reported in Armitage (2002) are from this method. For each offer a regression was run using daily data and dummy variables to distinguish sub-periods of interest:
where D 1,t = one for event days -1 to 0, and zero otherwise, day 0 being the announcement day. The other dummy variables picked out subsequent sub-periods, with which we are not concerned here. The combined estimation and event period was from 85 days before the announcement to 100 days after the offer close. The coefficient γ 1,j is a measure of the abnormal return for each day of the announcement sub-period, so the twoday announcement abnormal return is 2γ 1,j .
The results for 1991-95 using Armitage's data are reported in here. The distribution of the abnormal returns is somewhat skewed to the right, as the median is 1.52%. But the AAR of 2.91% is not due to outliers; it is 2.83% excluding the two highest and two lowest abnormal returns, and 2.53% excluding the four abnormal returns with an absolute value in excess of 20%.
Some of the observations in the forgoing samples should, arguably, be excluded because of problems with the data, as discussed in Armitage (2002 Armitage ( , p. 1258 The method of calculating the test statistic for significance makes a big difference to its numerical value, though in this case not to our conclusions. Many event studies, including Armitage (2002) , report a test statistic based on standardised abnormal returns (SARs). For the market model, the abnormal return for each share is standardised by dividing it by the standard error of the market model regression for the relevant share, and then a test statistic is calculated from the average of the SARs:
where N is the number of offers in the sample and T is the number of days over which the SAR is accumulated. The standardisation has the effect that shares with more volatile returns are given less weight in arriving at the test statistic. For the Eckbo-Masulis method,
where s γj is the standard error of the γ j coefficient for share j (Eckbo & Masulis, 1992, p. 319 ).
An alternative for the market and index models is to calculate a conventional tstatistic for the mean of a sample. In our case the sample consists of the two-day abnormal returns, so
where stdev(AR j ) is the standard deviation of the sample of two-day abnormal returns. It is striking that the test statistics based on SARs are several times larger than the conventional t-statistics. SARs can not be calculated using the index model, so (9) is probably the test statistic used by Iqbal et al. The AAR for the sample of 129 offers closest to that of Iqbal et al is significantly greater than 0 at the 1% level, according to the statistics in (7), (8) and (9). Since the AAR in Iqbal. et al is negative, the difference in the AARs between the two studies is almost certainly highly statistically significant.
The substantial difference in the AARs is perplexing. The samples should not differ much. The studies use different methods of calculating abnormal returns, but this is extremely unlikely to account for a difference in the AAR of 4.04 percentage points for a two-day event window. Brown and Warner (1985) , for example, find via simulation that the market and index models produce very similar results for event windows of one day and eleven days. 
Conclusion
Our checks have confirmed the initial impression of materially different results across the studies for both long and short run average abnormal returns, though the difference has narrowed in the case of the long run returns. We have discussed some possible explanations but remain uncertain as to why the results differ. The table reports ABHARs calculated as the average of the buy-and-hold returns of offer firms minus the buy-and-hold returns of matched firms. Firms are matched by size, by size and book-to-market ratio, and by size and industry. ABHARs are calculated for the 1-year, 3-year and 5-year post-offer holding periods. The sample is from Ngatuni et al. (2007) The table reports the average abnormal return (AAR) for the day before the announcement plus the announcement day, using abnormal returns calculated for Armitage (2002) . The market model AAR is given by equation (5) in the text and the two test statistics, t 1MM and t 2MM , are given by (5) and (7). The Eckbo-Masulis AAR and its test statistic are given by equations (7) and (8) 
